Misrepresenting Abolitionism: A Response to Dunayer
22 November 2006

What is a welfarist? What is an abolitionist? And how do we know the difference?

These questions sit at the center of a recent apologetic by Joan Dunayer forthcoming in the Journal of Animal Law. Her JAL article is intended to counter a nearly 30,000 word critique of her book Speciesism written by Jeff Perz. Perz’s critique – published in an abridged version in JAL – hinges on a basic theme in which Dunayer is alleged to have misappropriated the ideas of Gary Francione throughout her work. Dunayer defends herself against such charges mostly by rehashing her arguments and showing where her ideas allegedly differ from Francione’s. In this exercise, Dunayer claims that the incrementalist abolitionism articulated in Francione’s 1996 book Rain Without Thunder is not actually abolitionist, and is, instead, sliding into a kind of welfarism. This approach, I shall show, is flawed.

The stance that Dunayer takes on Francione’s alleged welfarism is, at best, misguided, and at worst outright mischaracterization. Over the past several decades, Gary Francione has articulated a powerful vision for abolitionism that serves as a clarion call for activists, academics, and others interested in promoting the interests of animals. In short, Francione provides what I see as the clearest, most articulate, and most powerful defense and prefiguration of abolitionist incrementalism anywhere. In his work, Francione repeatedly calls for an end to the instrumental use of animals, which he sees rooted in their condition as the property of another. To truly abolish animal exploitation, Francione argues that we must abolish animals as property, and instead, respect their interests as beings. Francione further stresses that veganism and abolitionist education should be the cornerstones of any abolitionist movement. These conclusions stand in sharp contrast to the kinds of welfarism being promoted in conventional animal rights organizations. Indeed, how one could read Francione as anything but an abolitionist is baffling.

Nevertheless, Dunayer manages to accuse Francione of promoting measures that slide into welfarism in her self-defense in JAL. One part of the contention for Dunayer comes over whether or not particular prohibitions or bans are abolitionist. This is in response to a section of Rain Without Thunder in which Francione lays out a series of conjunctive criteria for deciding whether or not particular regulatory bans or prohibitions are abolitionist. It is important to note that Francione prefaces his criteria with the notion that there are good reasons not to bother at all with legislation and regulation and that advocates should instead pursue abolitionist education, boycotts, protests, and other similar kinds of advocacy. He argues that any legislative campaign needs to be coupled with an educational campaign. The criteria at the end of Rain are intended to guide an incremental abolitionism should activists wish to pursue legislative or regulatory bans. The criteria are not intended to promote welfarism; instead, they’re intended to serve as guideposts for promoting the interests of animals as beings with inherent value for themselves – not as instrumental property for another. A full rehashing of Francione’s criteria is beyond the scope of this piece; anyone interested should read Rain Without Thunder.

The point of contention for Dunayer – in her apologetic in JAL and in Speciesism – comes over an example that Francione uses in discussing his criteria for abolitionist prohibitions. In making his point, Francione argues that a potential ban on battery cages such that hens have complete freedom of movement – provided his other criteria for abolitionism are met – might constitute an abolitionist prohibition. Such a prohibition would still see hens exploited as property, but could be viewed also as incrementally abolitionist because the prohibition recognizes a real interest of the animal were she no longer regarded as property. Also, such a ban is constitutive of the institution of exploitation. In other words, the prohibition is hitting directly at the heart of the exploitative activity. Moreover, the ban that Francione discusses would necessarily need to go beyond a merely cage-free situation; instead, as he points out in Rain, it would need to recognize the complete freedom of movement of hens. Such a ban could also be considered incrementally abolitionist because the prohibition recognizes a real interest of the animal were it no longer regarded as property.

In her reading of Francione, Dunayer sees this as the promotion of welfarism. For Dunayer, abolitionism must promote the absolute and total removal of animals from an exploitative industry or situation. For her, a ban on batter cages is not abolitionist, because it represents an alternate form of exploitation – one in which hens (as property) are forced to produce eggs, but with more freedom. In making this claim in her defense against Perz, Dunayer argues that Francione “collapses into ‘welfarism’” by arguing that a change in exploitation can be considered to be abolitionist. An abolitionist ban “prevents or halts, rather than mitigates, abuse.”

The problem with what Dunayer argues here contra Francione is that it ignores the fundamental insights of Rain Without Thunder. To view Francione as a welfarist requires intense mental gymnastics. Indeed, Dunayer’s elision of Francione’s argument with the tenets of welfarism is problematic precisely because it fails to adequately consider the criteria that Francione himself advocates in understanding abolitionist prohibitions. For Francione, hens free of a battery cage because of a prohibition but still in a condition of exploitation is not in any way a favorable end state. Francione does not even really advocate pursuing battery-cage bans; instead, he uses this as an example to think through his criteria. In the thought exercise that Francione is doing in Rain, such a prohibition can be viewed as an incremental step that also has the effect of banning a particular practice at the root of a system of exploitation while simultaneously forcing the farmer – a property holder – to recognize that hens have an inherent value beyond merely being property. In the hypothetical ban that Francione discusses, the farmer would have to respect the ban whether or not it was cost-effective and profitable for the production of eggs. Hens would still be in an exploitative system, but the abolitionist incrementalism comes through the fact that a substantial piece of this exploitative industry has been defeated, with potential impacts later for other animals. And of course, Francione would only advocate that abolitionists pursue such a ban were it possible that such a ban could meet all of the criteria he lays out in Rain. Francione’s example is no different from one that Dunayer herself uses. She argues that a prohibition on the use of a leghold trap is an abolitionist prohibition. But such a ban would still leave animals as property subject to human exploitation by means other than a leghold trap.

Interestingly, Francione anticipates a critique like Dunayer’s by arguing that even though the egg farmer may substitute another form of confinement for the battery cage, the animal rights activist cannot be held responsible for the substitution unless they’ve encouraged it, which Francione explicitly argues that they should not do. The point of this is to argue that a ban on caging is effective if it has been in the direction of eradicating the property status of animals, and in recognizing that animals have an interest based on their inherent value. The point of the criteria and of the hypothetical that Francione sets up is not merely to argue for cage-free hens; instead, it is intended to show how activists might choose to promote incremental steps that erode the property status of animals and the institution of exploitation. This is rather contrary to the notion that Dunayer puts forth by arguing that the ban “rests on the premise of continued exploitation.”

Finally – and perhaps, most importantly — what Dunayer misses in her selective reading of Francione is that he views any campaigns for legislative or regulatory bans as deeply flawed. He argues throughout his work that the interest of animal activists should be in abolishing, not regulating animal exploitation. In the JAL piece, Dunayer clearly wants to distinguish her work from Francione’s as her unique contribution to abolitionist theory, but the process of establishing this difference has thus far focused on straw-men constructed through a misinterpretation of Francione’s overall theoretical frame. Dunayer takes a similar tack her book Speciesism in critiquing Francione for using speciesist language in his work. By claiming that Francione reifies a speciesist mentality through euphemistic language, we again see a misreading of Francione that fails to recognize his actual arguments. It is an absurdity to charge Francione with speciesism for using the terms “animal agriculture, fish farms, [and] game ranches.” It is abundantly clear that Francione disproves of such operations given the overall argument in his work. Had he substituted the Dunayer-approved language for such activities, would anyone have known what he was writing about?

In the end, it is remarkably dispiriting to see an author using tactics that – regardless of intent – have the effect of distorting and misrepresenting the innovative and powerful work of another. Over the last several decades, Gary Francione has provided the animal rights movement with vital theory combined with a powerful prescriptive praxis based on abolitionism. By building her abolitionist theory on what is clearly either a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of Francione, Dunayer furthers neither the cause of abolitionism nor the theoretical or practical utility of her own work.

p.s. Lest anyone thinks I’m trying to be anonymous, this is who I am. I have nothing to hide.

  Posted by Bob Torres    Permalink    Filed under:
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